Conquest Designer University

The university — 27 qualifications taught as executable degrees; all 27 live in code today.

Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management · CDU-BUS-MBAS-910 · MBA · v1.0.0

MBA — Strategy

Market concentration and merger screening, the growth–share portfolio, customer lifetime value and the inverse-elasticity price — the four numbers behind where to compete and what to charge.

Lineage

  • Wits Business School, 2016 — supposed to be — the strategy stream of the MBA

Final research project

Where a venture should compete: concentration, portfolio position, customer value and price

Syllabus

  1. Industry structure: market shares, the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, merger screening
  2. Portfolio strategy: the BCG growth–share matrix, relative market share
  3. Customer strategy: retention, margin multiple, lifetime value, the acquisition-cost ceiling
  4. Pricing strategy: the Lerner index, price elasticity, the optimal markup

Reference

HHI
Σ s_i² over every firm, shares in percent (0–10,000); unconcentrated < 1,500, moderately 1,500–2,500, highly > 2,500 (US DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines 2010, §5.3)
Merger delta
ΔHHI = 2 · s_a · s_b for the two merging firms
BCG
relative market share = own share ÷ largest rival share; high growth ≥ 10 % a year; star · cash cow · question mark · dog (Henderson, BCG 1970)
CLV
m · r / (1 + d − r): margin per period m, retention r, discount d (Gupta & Lehmann 2003)
Lerner
(P − MC) / P = 1 / |ε|, so P* = MC · |ε| / (|ε| − 1) for |ε| > 1 (Lerner 1934)

Units

Market concentration and merger screening · The growth–share portfolio · Customer lifetime value · The inverse-elasticity price

Role when narrated: You are a strategy partner explaining where a client should compete and what to charge. Lead with the recommendation the numbers support, then the numbers, then the assumption that would overturn it.

Market concentration and merger screening · hhi_concentration

Try with the example

How concentrated is this market, and would merging two of its firms move it into a higher scrutiny band?

Reference: Herfindahl–Hirschman Index; US DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010) §5.3 bands; shares are normalised to sum to 100

Returns

hhi
HHI before any merger, 0–10,000
band
unconcentrated · moderately concentrated · highly concentrated
delta
ΔHHI from the merger, 0 when none is named
postMergerHhi
HHI after the merger
postMergerBand
the band after the merger

The example

{
  "shares": [
    30,
    25,
    20,
    15,
    10
  ],
  "mergingA": 2,
  "mergingB": 3
}

Agents: POST /faculty/mba-strategy/hhi_concentration with JSON {pan, …inputs} and the x-402-payment header. Manifest.

The growth–share portfolio · bcg_portfolio

Try with the example

Is this business unit a star, a cash cow, a question mark or a dog — and why?

Reference: Henderson (1970), the BCG growth–share matrix: relative market share ≥ 1 is high; market growth ≥ 10 % a year is high

Returns

relativeShare
Own share ÷ largest rival share
quadrant
star · cash cow · question mark · dog

The example

{
  "marketGrowthPct": 14,
  "ownSharePct": 18,
  "largestRivalSharePct": 12
}

Agents: POST /faculty/mba-strategy/bcg_portfolio with JSON {pan, …inputs} and the x-402-payment header. Manifest.

Customer lifetime value · customer_lifetime

Example filled in — consult below

What is a retained customer worth today, and so what is the most it is worth paying to win one?

Reference: Gupta & Lehmann (2003): CLV = m · r / (1 + d − r), margins at the end of each period, constant retention and discount

Returns

marginMultiple
r ÷ (1 + d − r)
clv
Lifetime value of one retained customer
maxAcquisitionCost
The acquisition cost at which winning the customer breaks even (= CLV)

The example

{
  "marginPerPeriod": 240,
  "retentionRate": 0.8,
  "discountRate": 0.12
}

Agents: POST /faculty/mba-strategy/customer_lifetime with JSON {pan, …inputs} and the x-402-payment header. Manifest.

The inverse-elasticity price · lerner_pricing

Try with the example

Given marginal cost and how sensitive demand is to price, what price maximises profit, and how much market power does it imply?

Reference: Lerner (1934): (P − MC)/P = 1/|ε|; the profit-maximising price P* = MC · |ε| / (|ε| − 1), defined for elastic demand |ε| > 1

Returns

optimalPrice
P* = MC · ε / (ε − 1)
lernerIndex
(P − MC) / P = 1 / ε
markupOnCost
(P − MC) / MC

The example

{
  "marginalCost": 60,
  "elasticity": 2.5
}

Agents: POST /faculty/mba-strategy/lerner_pricing with JSON {pan, …inputs} and the x-402-payment header. Manifest.

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